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CAP’s Doing What Works project promotes government reform to efficiently allocate scarce resources and 
achieve greater results for the American people. This project specifically has three key objectives: 
•	 Eliminating or redesigning misguided spending programs and tax expenditures, focused on priority areas 
such as health care, energy, and education
•	 Boosting government productivity by streamlining management and strengthening operations in the areas 
of human resources, information technology, and procurement
•	 Building a foundation for smarter decision-making by enhancing transparency and performance  
measurement and evaluation
This paper is one in a series of reports examining government accountability and efficiency.
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Introduction and summary
At a time when deficit reduction is a national priority bordering on obsession, 
there is a relatively painless way for the federal government to save millions of dol-
lars while at the same time ensuring contractors do not perform inherently gov-
ernmental functions—simply bring specific key jobs back into the public domain.
In recent years a practice known as “insourcing”—where government agencies 
move work back in-house—has been gaining traction. Insourcing has been suc-
cessfully embraced by a number of federal agencies, including the Department of 
Homeland Security, the Internal Revenue Service, and the U.S. Army, reversing a 
longstanding trend that saw more and more federal work going to private con-
tractors. Why is federal insourcing a good thing? Here are three reasons why we 
believe returning certain government jobs to the public domain makes sense:
•	 Insourcing saves money. The information technology division of U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection at the Department of Homeland Security estimated that 
it saved $27 million in 2010 out of a budget of $400 million by taking 200 pri-
vate contractors and giving those same individuals government jobs.1 Likewise, 
approximately half of the 17,000 jobs that the Department of Defense brought 
back in-house in 2010 were done simply because the Pentagon was able to save 
money.2 In a similar move the Internal Revenue Service abandoned experiments 
with outsourcing debt collection after the agency calculated that contractors 
brought in less revenue than federal employees.3
•	 Contractors should not perform some jobs. Contractors are sometimes hired 
to do work that the government considers an inherent public duty such 
as making decisions on federal matters. Such jobs should be returned to 
the public sector. Tax collection is one task that has been ruled inherently 
governmental because of the potential conflicts of interest, but the task has 
occasionally been outsourced. Another task with a potential conflict of interest 
is contractor oversight of other contractors. This often occurs in unexpected and 
extraordinary situations such as the response in the wake of Hurricane Katrina 
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and the reconstruction effort in Iraq, but it also occurs when there is a freeze 
in federal hiring. Encouraging federal agencies to hire in-house staff to conduct 
such key governmental tasks will improve the quality of such work.
•	 Agencies can lose vital in-house skills through outsourcing. When the Bush 
administration decided to hire contract interrogators during the Iraq war, it 
spurred trained personnel to quit the military in order to benefit from the higher 
pay and flexible lifestyles afforded contractor employees. The same was true 
in other government sectors such as intelligence and foreign policy. Experts 
are understandably concerned about the long-term impact of this trend. Mark 
Lowenthal, a former CIA assistant director, told Congress during a 2011 hearing 
that his agency was now relying on staff with less than five years experience—
”It’s the least experienced analytical staff since 1947, and this demographic trend 
will play out in years to come.”4 Ensuring the right balance of contractors and 
government personnel in the federal workforce must remain a key federal goal.
To be sure, the idea of expanding government and hiring more bureaucrats at 
a time when budgets are tight may seem wasteful, but it is more practical and 
simple than one might expect. Insourcing often results in the individual contractor 
being hired to do the same work in the very same office under a more direct chain 
of command. Eliminating the need to pay for the additional layer of corporate 
bureaucracy that comes with the hiring of a contractor not only saves money, but 
it can also improve services to the taxpayer if done wisely.
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Federal contractor landscape
 
 
Recent statistics from the Office of Personnel Management, or OPM, put the 
number of workers on the federal payroll at 2 million, compared to 7.6 million 
contractors—a ratio of almost 4-to-1, an all-time high.5 With this in mind, several 
important questions need to be asked:
•	 Is outsourcing always a good idea? 
•	 Do contractors always save money or does the opposite sometimes occur? 
•	 Does the use of contractors sometimes give a for-profit entity power over public 
services in a way that would be detrimental to the greater good? 
•	 Does the use of contractors make citizens hostage to the vagaries of supply and 
demand that may degrade our access at a critical moment in time?
Most people believe there are some jobs, such as running a city or making foreign 
policy decisions, that the private sector should never undertake. Elected or 
appointed officials perform these jobs because they involve making decisions on 
behalf of the public good.
With other jobs, however, the answer can be fluid. Running garbage services on 
a military base in peacetime, for example, might be done by the private sector 
to allow soldiers to spend more time in necessary training. On the other hand, 
private-sector employees may not be the best choice on a small military outpost 
in a war zone, even if anyone would be willing to do the job, because the cost of 
protecting those private workers could well be more expensive than assigning 
the task to soldiers.
The Office of Management and Budget’s Circular A-76 is a key test of whether the 
government should use a contractor or a federal employee for any given job.6 The 
rules, originally written in 1966, require federal agencies to determine whether 
the private sector can do the same job for less money. This 46-year-old memo also 
introduced the idea of making sure that “inherently governmental” work stayed 
off-limits to private contractors.
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Over time, however, lawmakers allowed and even required more and more federal 
work to be handed over to contractors. The Federal Activities Inventory Reform, 
or FAIR, Act of 1998 instructed government agencies to issue an annual inventory 
of their service contracts explaining which federal activities were not inherently 
governmental, the number of jobs that were available, and the name of the contact 
person in charge of the specified activities.7
Despite the guidelines, confusion over whether or not tasks are inherently gov-
ernmental has persisted over the years. In October 2011 the White House Office 
of Management and Budget, or OMB, revised the guidelines on this subject, 
giving examples of what it considered “inherently governmental” and absolutely 
off limits for contractors.8 The guidelines also defined “closely associated” func-
tions that could be done by contractors so long as there was appropriate oversight. 
Finally, the memo defined the term “critical functions”—work that is essential to 
an agency’s core mission and operations.
Yet the debate continues, particularly given that a number of the inherently gov-
ernmental, closely associated, and critical-function jobs as defined by the OMB 
2011 memo are already being conducted by contractors. Adding to the discourse 
is the fact that the use of contractors is often arguably more expensive than using 
federal employees, which is hard to defend in an era of high government debt.
Cost savings
Since the A-76 rule was enacted in 1966, a steady drumbeat of calls for smaller 
government has resulted in more and more federal work being outsourced. This 
profitable business model has also spurred an active campaign against insourc-
ing. Recently a newly established industry group called the Business Coalition 
for Fair Competition, or BCFC, which is run by the public relations firm John M. 
Palatiello & Associates, has launched a campaign claiming that insourcing is “steal-
ing private sector jobs and creating more expensive government jobs.”9
Nothing could be further from the truth. A comprehensive study by the Project 
On Government Oversight has debunked this notion that government jobs are 
always more expensive. The study, “Bad Business: Billions of Dollars Wasted on 
Hiring Contractors,”10 calculated that the federal government was paying nearly 
twice as much—1.83 times—more for contracted services on an average than if 
it hired federal workers, even after accounting for long-term employee benefits. 
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While many government employees are certainly paid a higher salary and better 
benefits than the average contractor, the cheaper salary of the contractor was more 
than offset by the fact that the government had to pay for overhead, executive 
compensation, and profits of the contractor’s employer. 
Perhaps the most interesting discovery was that contractors charge less for the very 
same services when working in the private sector than when they worked for gov-
ernment, suggesting that contractors are prone to overcharging the government.
Accountants and auditors, for example, typically earn less than $100,000 in the 
private sector and $119,000 on an average as federal employees, but they charge 
the federal government nearly $300,000 as federal contractors.11 Sometimes a 
government job pays better than a private-sector one, but government contrac-
tors are still the most expensive by far. Consider that the average government 
lawyer earns $175,081, the average private-sector lawyer earns $220,924, but 
contract lawyers working for the federal government bill the government an 
average of $554,923.12 Indeed, a contract law clerk often charges the government 
more than it would cost to hire a federal lawyer.13
The opportunity for saving when comparing contractors to federal employees doing 
the same job has been demonstrated a number of times. A recent Department of 
Defense study of the 17,000 jobs that were insourced by the agency in 2010 showed 
that the majority of the 4,732 Air Force jobs converted, almost all the 620 jobs at the 
Defense Finance and Accounting Services, as well as many of the 2,728 Navy jobs 
insourced, were done solely on basis of cost savings. All told, the Pentagon calcu-
lated that half of the jobs converted were done so to save money.14
Other agencies are also discovering that hiring-in individuals who are already 
doing federal work on behalf of a contractor can result in cost savings simply by 
eliminating the middleman. Bob Neubert, executive director of the enterprise 
networks and technology support division of Customs and Border Protection at 
DHS, told Federal Computer Week that his division saved $27 million in 2010 out 
of a budget of $400 million by making 200 contractors federal employees. The 
savings were achieved not by paying them less, but instead by not having to pay an 
outside company for their services.15
Indeed, the competition between the private sector and the public sector has 
repeatedly shown that outsourcing does not necessarily save money. The OMB 
reported that federal agencies conducted 1,375 A-76 tests between 2003 and 2007 
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resulting in savings of $1.88 billion. In 83 percent of the cases, as measured by 
the total jobs competed, the federal government was able to do the work cheaper, 
rather than the other way around.16 Sometimes this was a result of re-engineering 
the workforce, but that is still an argument for better human-resources manage-
ment rather than an argument to use outside contractors.
One of the justifications that contractors often use to make their case is that they 
are more efficient than government workers. Given the vast cost differences cited 
earlier, it would seem that such claims need to be measured very carefully to arrive 
at a definitive answer. One study did exactly that—a 2006 experiment conducted 
by the IRS called the Private Debt Collection initiative, which offered contractors 
a 25 percent incentive to bring in so-called “simple” cases.17
In 2008 the initiative was scrapped when an IRS review found that it cost three 
times as much to hire private debt collectors as it did to use federal employ-
ees.18 Further, the less expensive government employees were able to resolve 
more delinquent tax cases because they had more authority to garnish wages. 
Conversely, cutting back on tax collection has also been found to be penny-wise 
but pound-foolish. A recent decision by officials in Jefferson County, Alabama, to 
lay off four employees saved the government $180,000 a year but threatened the 
collection of $2.7 million from delinquent taxpayers.19
That’s not to say that contractors are always much more expensive. In fact at the 
lower end of the pay scale, contractors can be quite a bit cheaper because they pay 
workers minimum wage and low or no benefits. Of course that is not exactly a 
recommended policy, if only because many of these workers are likely to rely more 
heavily on the government for social services as a result. A 2006 report by the labor 
union UNITE HERE found that each 100-person factory making uniforms for the 
U.S. military was eligible for approximately $292,000 in public assistance a year.20
Conflicts of interest
Contractors are often hired to oversee other contractors in rapid response opera-
tions where the government does not have the staff to take on unexpected responsi-
bilities. This was true after the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and in the response 
to Hurricane Katrina. The Federal Acquisition Regulation maintains that such work 
is “closely associated” with government but not “inherently governmental.” Such a 
bureaucratic approach is fraught with conflicts of interest since many of these con-
tractors routinely bid on both supervision and implementation contracts.
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The State Department, for example, paid out $700,000 to a “personal services con-
tractor” to conduct oversight of other contractors that were working on a criminal-
justice development program in Iraq.21 Meanwhile, the U.S. Army spent $62 million 
on contractors to oversee the $7.6 billion Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, or 
LOGCAP, contracts in Afghanistan and Iraq.22 And in Afghanistan, Aegis, a British 
security company, was asked to provide oversight over other “close protection” secu-
rity contractors despite the fact that it had a contract to do “close protection” in Iraq.23
Dig a little deeper and the use of contractors to oversee other contractors turns 
out to be even more commonplace because of the extensive use of prime contrac-
tors who in turn farm out work to subcontractors. One outlandish example of this 
practice played out in Florida in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. As 
reported by NBC News, a Florida company, AshBritt Inc., was paid $500 million 
to remove hurricane debris at a rate of $23 per cubic yard. According to NBC, Ash 
Britt subcontracted the work to C&B Enterprises Inc., which was paid $9 a cubic 
yard. C&B in turn hired Amlee Transportation Inc. for $8 a cubic yard, which 
in turn hired Chris Hessler Inc. for $7 a cubic yard, who hired a man named Les 
Nirdlinger who was paid $3 a cubic yard to do the actual work.24
Subcontracting has always been a common practice and is neither illegal nor neces-
sarily bad. Manufacturers of specialized equipment, for example, rely heavily on 
subcontractors to supply parts. But when manual labor is performed under numer-
ous layers of management, it suggests oversight has been abdicated at tremendous 
cost to the taxpayer. Here again, eliminating the middleman of outside contractors 
could save the taxpayer a great deal of money. Certainly the federal government does 
not need to hire federal workers simply to haul debris, but it does need to oversee 
such work to make sure it gets the best value for its taxpayer dollar.
The flawed use of contractors is not confined to disaster response. A 2011 
Government Accountability Office study of “service contract inventories” that 
are intended to identify “inherently governmental” tasks found 2,357 contrac-
tors doing work for the U.S. Army that is supposed to be reserved exclusively for 
federal employees. Another 1,877 contractors were doing “unauthorized personal 
services” for the Army, while 45,934 contractors were doing Army jobs that are 
considered closely associated with inherently governmental functions that require 
strict oversight and management.25
This should not be happening. If the “service contract inventories” were properly 
maintained with accurate data on the cost of these contracts, it should be possible 
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to identify contractors that are inappropriately performing “inherently govern-
mental” or “closely associated” functions as well as contracts that cost too much. 
In fact a bipartisan letter to the Secretary of Defense this past November has urged 
the Pentagon to “improve the inventory as a reliable and complete data set.”26
Eliminating conflicts of interest will take time, but is essential to ensure compli-
ance with the law. Unfortunately Congress has often acted to thwart this goal by 
threatening to freeze all federal hiring.27 The result is that agencies turn to outside 
contractors and end up spending more instead of less, as we noted previously.
Of course, hiring caps are not the only reason for using contractors instead of federal 
employees. Sometimes the federal hiring process is so bureaucratic and time con-
suming that agencies turn to contractors simply to meet crucial staffing needs.28
Loss of expertise
Yet another negative consequence of relying too heavily on contractors is that 
the federal government becomes subject to supply and demand and the whims 
of market forces that determine contractor pay rates. So long as there is adequate 
competition, this is not a problem. But it is also important to note that the market 
supplies only what is in demand.
At the State Department or the CIA, for example, personnel are expected to rotate 
through different regions and divisions. As they progress in their careers, these 
individuals become experienced in a variety of diplomatic or intelligence skills as 
well as understanding the nuances of cultures, history, and politics in many different 
countries. On the other hand, contractors do not necessarily rotate staff as extensively, 
but instead respond just to demand. Thus with the outbreak of the Iraq war in 2003, 
Iraq experts were in demand, but conversely Tunisian or Libyan experts weren’t in 
demand. This lack of demand meant that contractors had their staffs focus on learning 
about and understanding Iraq, which resulted in the slow loss in expertise of coun-
tries like Tunisia or Libya that could have been useful during the Arab Spring in 2011.
The problem is not, of course, solely the fault of contractors. Bill Golden, a former 
military intelligence analyst who runs IntelligenceCareers.com, says that the 
shortage of qualified interrogators in the wake of 9/11 was a direct consequence 
of poor planning following the end of the Cold War. “The military worked as 
hard as it could to create a brain drain (with the conclusion of the Cold War) by 
moving qualified intelligence people into other jobs, who then quit. As a result by 
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September 11, 2001, there was no one left who had a clue,” Golden told this writer 
in 2005. “Now they are rushing to catch up and create 9,000 new specialists, but 
it takes at least five years to become really experienced. What we have now is a 
nursery full of babies in the army.”29
In the meantime, the military turned to contract interrogators who were pressed 
into service quickly at high salaries to work at places like the Abu Ghraib prison 
in Iraq. The urgent need for interrogators and the easy availability of these jobs 
resulted in many just-trained military interrogators quitting the service to sign on 
with contractors.30 As a result the government ended up paying more money to 
hire the very people it had just trained in addition to exacerbating the downward 
spiral in terms of the experience of military interrogators. Golden says he noticed 
that the pool of applicants he was interviewing went from 5 to 10 years of experi-
ence to three to five over a couple of years.31
The contracting companies also typically oversell their expertise by padding bids 
with resumes from people that aren’t on staff and that they haven’t hired yet. Former 
CIA assistant director Lowenthal notes that winning contractors poach senior staff 
from government, leaving agencies staffed with low-level junior employees. “It’s the 
least experienced analytical staff since 1947, and this demographic trend will play 
out in years to come,” Lowenathal told Congress at a 2011 hearing.32 
A recent freeze on the military hiring civilians has similarly impacted federal 
work by creating a shortage of experienced personnel for key positions that 
are either inherently governmental or closely associated jobs. The Pentagon, 
for example, now depends heavily on contractors to oversee weapons develop-
ment because of the civilian workforce hiring freeze.33 As many as two out of 
every three staff at the Pentagon’s developmental test and evaluation office are 
contractors, and five out of every six staff at its system-engineering office are 
contractors. With no access to sufficient federal staff, the office has simply cut 
back on testing. A recent GAO study noted that in 2010, 36 percent of programs 
received no support from the testing office.34
Commenting on the testing situation, officials at the National Academy of 
Sciences note that the Department of Defense “cannot outsource its technical 
and program management experience and intellect and still expect to acquire new 
systems that are both effective and affordable.”35
Allowing federal agencies to insource such inherently governmental work should 
improve both the quantity and quality of oversight of other contractors. 
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Conclusion
Recommendations for reform
In light of the various problems and challenges related to an overreliance on pri-
vate companies to conduct government work as detailed in this report, we believe 
it is incumbent on the federal government to reform the current contractor system 
with an eye to adopting a more flexible approach to insourcing jobs. Specifically, 
we recommend the following:
•	 Contracts with companies that perform inherently governmental work should 
be flagged and allowed to lapse or be canceled. The individuals who are doing 
this work can be hired as federal employees with no loss in service delivery 
if they are found qualified to do the work. Equally, federal employees must 
adequately supervise jobs closely associated to inherently governmental work.
•	 Subcontracting must be studied more closely. If prime contractors are adding 
multiple layers of management bureaucracy that do not add value, this must be 
addressed and remedied. The federal government should minimize occurrences 
of contractors supervising other contractors to instances of benign influence and 
should not permit it in any other circumstances.
•	 When federal employees can perform a job for less money than the contractor 
billing rate, the job should be considered for insourcing. One way to accomplish 
this is to regularly examine the “service contract inventory” data that every 
agency is required to maintain for the billing rates rather than just salary data, 
which demonstrates the cost of using contractors. It must be noted that these 
data are often poor quality and need to be improved. Changes to what data are 
collected and how they are analyzed will need to be done by the OMB or by 
legislative change to the FAIR Act.
•	 Ensuring the right balance of contractors and government personnel in the 
federal workforce must remain a key federal goal. Agencies should ensure 
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that turning to the contractor workforce does not hobble the government in 
mission-critical work.
•	 Last but not least, the federal hiring process must continue to be examined and 
improved. The Obama administration has made important efforts to stream-
line the federal hiring process.36 But shortsighted money-saving practices in 
Congress like a hiring freeze sometimes protect less-than-qualified workers and 
deny opportunities to skilled personnel. Agencies often turn to contractors, not 
simply because they are either less expensive or better, but because it is easier 
and quicker to hire or fire contractors than it is a government employee. If the 
“service contract inventories” are properly maintained, it will be possible to 
estimate the true costs of outsourcing.
Finally, insourcing offers the federal government the opportunity to save sig-
nificant real dollars at a time of constrained budgets. Just as important as saving 
money, it is critical to ensure that the public good is not left to either chance or to 
the pursuit of profit.
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